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Introduction 
 
This research  paper is to be focused on analysis of governance and enterprise restructuring in 
transition economies of South-Eastern Europe (Western Balkans) . According to international 
organizations,  South-Eastern European (Western Balkan) countries are: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has governance and enterprise 
restructuring as basic indicator of economic transition and defines it as effective corporate 
governance and corporate control carried out through domestic financial institutions and markets 
fostering market-driven restructuring. The corporate governance is most commonly identified in 
terms of the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of top management and board of directors.  
 
Using data of South-Eastern European economies, we will analyze  the interrelationships 
between governance and enterprise restructuring and set of policies that influence the governance 
patterns. 
 
Two basic hypotheses to test governance and enterprise restructuring are: 
 
• 1
st
 Hypothesis: governance and enterprise restructuring depends on set of policies, such 
as large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition 
policy, trade and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform; 
• 2
nd
 Hypothesis: governance and enterprise restructuring is important and improves over 
time due to imposed policies.  
 
The academic significance of the topic is in determining the factors that influence governance 
and enterprise restructuring, as well as, its overall significance in the development of Western 
Balkans transition economies. 
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Theoretical and Literature Framework  
 
1. The Theory of Privatization 
 
The theory of privatization is narrowly tied to the countries that have gone through overall 
process of command economy and holistic public ownership of means of production and clarifies 
that such ownership suffers serious efficiency loss, agency problems and political interference in 
the management of firms. Thus, information asymmetries and incomplete contracting 
problems lead to severe incentive default which is the main problem for efficiency losses 
(Zinnes, Eilat, & Sachs, 2001). Hence, the incentive–efficiency pattern i.e. agency problem 
shows  two manifestations. First, the managerial problem consists of failure caused by the 
inability of the state to monitor managers in state-owned companies, i.e. managers tend to 
maximize their own utility function, at the expense of the owners. Further, the companies do not 
have market value,   hence a separation of ownership and control is not possible (Vickers & 
Yarrow, 1990). Second, there is a political problem of constant political obstruction and 
distortion of objectives from profit to employment maximization (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1996; Shapiro & Willig, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  
 
In transition economies, the most prominent way to make transformation and initial privatization 
was done through transfer of the ownership from public to private hands through the so-called  
‘shock therapy’ i.e. ‘transfer as fast as possible’ (Kołodko, 2000; Lipton, Sachs, & Summers, 
1990). Another advocated way was ‘gradual sales’(Kornai, 1990).  Thus, in overall transition 
theory, it is widely believed that once the ownership is in private hands, the market forces will 
spin  processes that are going to eventually create all necessary institutions.  Moreover, the 
emerging shareholder class is to require and put in place corporate governance institutions 
insuring control over managers (Balcerowicz, 1993; Sachs, 1996; Stiglitz, 1998).  
 
The privatization processes due to existing theory and lack of practice, triggered three basic 
methods of privatization depending on the country, institutional and intellectual environment 
(Bennett, 2004a, 2004b) :  
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1. MASS privatization - firms sold at zero (or nominal) price 
2. FULL privatization - firms sold to outsiders for positive prices 
3. MIXED privatization - manager-employee buyouts (MEBOs), leased buyouts and all 
other cases. 
 
Figure I.1 Transition Economies: South- Eastern Europe 
1
  
 Country Classification 
of 
Privatization 
Year of 
Privatization 
Primary 
Method 
Secondary 
Method 
1. Albania Mixed 1995 MEBO vouchers 
2. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Mixed 1996 MEBO direct sales 
3. Croatia Mixed 1992 MEBO vouchers 
4. Macedonia Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales 
5. Montenegro Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales 
6. Serbia  Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales 
 
2. National Governance Systems 
 
Two important things that have to be taken under consideration while analyzing national 
governance systems and corporate governance are: a) the influence of different stakeholders in 
the national system of governance to shape the strategic decision making at firm level, and b) the 
influence of corporate governance institutions  supplemented by the overall attractiveness for 
international investment (Apostolov, 2011; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; McGee & 
Preobragenskaya, 2004). 
 
Consequently, the influence of different stakeholders in the national system of governance on the 
strategic decision making at firm level is seen through competitive advantage pattern as well as 
through the possibility these institutions to enable or restrict business practices (ex. protection of 
investors, protection of employees, minority stakeholder protection, etc.) (Filatotchev, Wright, 
Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003). 
 
                                                 
1
 Bennett, John, Estrin, Saul, Maw, James, Urga, Giovanni, 2004b. Privatization Methods and Economic Growth in 
Transition Economies. CEPR 4291. 
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Second important issue is that  both institutional framework and institutional governance regime 
can influence attractiveness for foreign investment. Hence, it has been noted the impact on the 
nature of foreign market entry modes or the extent to which certain market entry can facilitate a 
transfer of resources from entrant to entrée and vice-versa (Denis & McConnell, 2005). 
Furthermore,  it is important to stress that institutional differences between countries have an 
effect on their corporate governance regimes (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
1. Sample Selection and Data 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report series 
contain the latest information on the countries  in transition. The data offered by this prominent 
organization  is based on a wide network of sources   obtained from national and international 
authorities (Bennett, 2004a, 2004b; Zinnes et al., 2001). EBRD tracks reforms and assesses the 
overall process of transition using set of transition indicators, which are formed in comparison to 
the standards of industrialized market economies.  
Furthermore, the data sample is mainly drawn from extended research and data bases of 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report publication 
series.As a result , the data used in this research  is taken from their index structure ‘economic 
statistics and forecasts’ (EBRD, 1994-2009). A scale used in shaping the transition indicators 
ranges from 1 to 4+, ‘where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned 
economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy’ (EBRD, 1994-
2009). There are detailed numbers for the countries in transition analyzing the period of 1989 to 
2009 in different areas. These indicators are sorted by sector and country.  They analyze nine 
areas: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, 
price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and 
interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and overall 
infrastructure reform (EBRD, 1994-2009; Gouret, 2007). 
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2. Model and Econometrics  
 
The econometric model used in this study is a regression model where we have estimated the 
following equation (Freedman, 2005): 
 
ipipio xxi εβββγ ++++= ...11    (1) 
 
ni ,...1=    (2) 
 
Thus, applied to our research, this model has the following  formula: 
 
titititititioti OIRSMNBFIBRIRLTFSCPPLSSPLSPGOV ,t i,8t  i,7t i,6,5,4,3,2,1, εβββββββββ +++++++++=
(3)  
where: 
 the dependent variable, 
tiGOV , . shows governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 the independent variables are as follows :  
1. 
tiLSP ,  large-scale privatization;  
2. 
tiSSP ,  small-scale privatization;  
3. 
tiPL ,  price liberalization; 
4. 
tiCP , competition policy;  
5. 
tiTFS ,  trade and foreign exchange system;  
6. 
t i,BRIRL banking reform and interest rate liberalization;  
7. 
t  i,SMNBFI securities markets and non-bank financial institutions;  
8. 
t i,OIR overall infrastructure reform; 
 β  is a p-dimensional parameter vector;  
 ε  is an error term or noise. 
 
 
9 
 
Results and Effects 
 
1. Results on the First Assumption  
 
 
The first hypothesis is that governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies: 
large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, trade 
and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets 
and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform. The transition theory 
explains well the effects of privatization, restructuring, competition, budget constraints, policies 
of governance and management (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). 
  
The country results of the OLS regression (Figure 3) show that there is important development of 
governance and enterprise restructuring during the entire period of transition. Yet, the effect of 
variables which most influence governance and enterprise restructuring in this set of countries is 
mixed. When analyzed the large-scale privatization variable (Filatotchev & Mickiewicz, 2003) 
and its impact on countries’ governance and enterprise restructuring, it was found that there is 
positive impact in B&H, Croatia and Montenegro, negative in Albania, Macedonia and 
significant in Serbia (p < 0.01).   
 
Furthermore, small-scale privatization influenced governance and enterprise restructuring 
positively in Albania, Croatia and Montenegro, negatively in B&H and Serbia and  significantly 
in Macedonia (p < 0.01). When analyzed price liberalization as important milestone and 
instrument of transition, we can see that there is upbeat influence in B&H, Macedonia and 
Serbia; however, on the other hand, it behaves indifferent in Albania, Croatia and Montenegro. 
The trade and foreign exchange system were liberalized and recently they are being made 
compatible to the European Union’s internal market as these countries approach the Euro-
integration processes (De Macedo & Martins, 2008). In the period of our observation, the trade 
and foreign exchange system gave good results in almost all countries except Montenegro and 
Serbia, where the results are mixed in relation to governance and enterprise restructuring. 
 
10 
 
Legislating a competition policy and imposing it properly in transition economies was and still 
remains important issue, especially because of the fact that the command systems were 
characterized with state monopolies and, as such, were protected and nourished through ‘soft-
budget constraint’ practice.  The relation of competition policy to governance and enterprise 
restructuring is positive in Croatia; negative in Albania, B&H, and Serbia; significant in 
Macedonia and in the case of Montenegro, it gave mixed results depending on the model. The 
banking reform and interest rate liberalization show good results in all the countries, as well as 
the reform on securities’ markets and non-bank financial institutions except Serbia in the latter 
case.  
 
Finally, the overall infrastructure reform gave negative result for almost all analyzed countries 
and it is most probable due to the fact that the disinvestment in infrastructure is constant lag in 
transition countries. 
 
Almost two decades of transition is fairly enough to allow good research on the links between 
different economic reforms. It is worthwhile to stress that all these countries started from highly 
distorted system and were introduced with policy reforms designed to introduce market 
mechanisms in order to make the allocation of resources as efficient as possible, while creating 
conditions for sustainable growth and improvement of living standards (De Macedo & Martins, 
2008). 
 
Therefore, examining these various variables, which represent introduced policies in SEE 
countries that undergo stressful process of overall society transformation, can confirm the 
uneasiness of the overall process as well as the varied impact of any of these policies to each 
other and supplementary policy issues. 
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2. Results on the Second Assumption  
 
According to the second hypothesis,  governance and enterprise restructuring is important and it 
improves over time due to imposed policies.  
 
EBRD assesses progress in transition through a set of transition indicators  used to track reform 
developments since the commencement of transition (EBRD, 1994-2009).  These indicators and 
the tables in the Figure 3 and Figure 4 can help us measure the possible outcomes of the second 
hypothesis.  
 
The country results (Figure 3 and Figure 4) confirm this hypothesis with some mixed outcomes 
i.e. it is important and lethargically improves over time. In fact, the close relation with number of 
these policies shows a significant impact of the policies on the way governance and enterprise 
restructuring was imposed, positively or negatively.  Thus, there is good correlation to analyzed 
variables that represent the manner in which observed policies have been developing during the 
period of transition, however mixed outcomes to how each of these variables impacts governance 
and enterprise restructuring. Nonetheless, over time, most of the variables improved and it is 
clear that there is noteworthy relationship between them moving upwards. 
 
Further, in Figure 4 (and Figure 3 in many segments when observed through particular 
variables), we can analyze the movements of governance and enterprise restructuring over time. 
Indeed, in this study, the analyzed variable (governance and enterprise restructuring) moved 
towards increase and positive upward climb indicated through the rise of all countries’ curves. 
Hence, it can be noted that most of the progress has been done in Croatia, followed by 
Macedonia (IFC, 2007). In the mid range is Serbia, and in the lower part of governance and 
enterprise restructuring progress are Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, 
Figure 4 confirms the positive movement up, relative to the process of transition over time. 
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Discussion  
 
Due to the analysis of the first assumption, where a relation was made between governance and 
enterprise restructuring and imposed set of policies, the outcomes have shown  mixed results. 
Indeed, there are positive and negative pressures of introduced policies on governance and 
enterprise restructuring in the set of SEE countries. However, it is evident that, overall, there is a 
satisfactory picture of governance and enterprise restructuring progress. 
 
The second hypothesis analyzed the importance and progress of corporate governance and 
enterprise restructuring. Hence, due to this observation, conducted through combination of the 
basic findings of the first analyzed assumption as well as  the compared movement of only 
corporate governance and enterprise restructuring variables of the countries in question, it was 
found that the transition process progresses along with the imposed reforms, and policies 
triggered a positive inclination of governance and enterprise restructuring. 
 
However, the overall outcome of these countries is mixed as there are significant improvements 
in some countries and noteworthy lags in other. Indeed, there should be a considerable 
improvement in corporate governance, institution-building in order to control agency problems, 
imposing of already adopted regulation, as well as, adopting new ways of enterprise restructuring 
within the existing policies of overall economy restructuring.  
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